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Poverty Alleviation: A Critique of Current Paradigms*1
Susanne D. Mueller
Introduction
This paper raises questions about current paradigms (Kuhn, 1996) of integrated rural development, envi-
ronmental sustainability, and poverty alleviation. The terms themselves are ill deﬁ  ned and elusive, at best 
representing desired end states. There also continues to be little concrete understanding of the relationship 
between means and ends. 
Earlier paradigms of development were largely Keynesian and state centric, with a strong empha-
sis on growth. More recent understandings have stood this worldview on its head. Analysts no longer see 
the state as the engine of production, growth, and equity. Instead, new paradigms celebrate the local over 
the national, civil society in preference to government, and micro-entrepreneurship rather than industri-
alization as the way to overcome poverty and achieve rural development. The private sector rather than 
the state is seen as the preferred supplier of agricultural services, whether speaking of marketing, credit, 
or input supply. Furthermore, lapses in reaching desired end states tend not to critique these means-ends 
hypotheses themselves. Instead, residual if not euphemistic explanations of a lack of capacity and partici-
pation often are invoked, again without much content or analysis as to what the real problem is.
Notwithstanding the many issues and questions that have arisen in the application of these new 
paradigms, there is still an almost unquestioned, if not religious, faith in their ability to contribute more 
effectively to rural development, environmental sustainability, and poverty alleviation than past approach-
es. Like the hard sciences, donors and academics tend to cling to their paradigms. Unlike them, paradigms 
tend to shift when they are unfashionable or politically out of tune rather than when they are wrong.
This essay raises questions and discusses issues that have emerged when these new ‘isms’ of 
development have been applied in the ﬁ  eld. The intent is to highlight problems faced by rural people on 
a daily basis in the face of these new paradigms. The hope is that the analysis below will lead to criti-
cal thinking about the paradigms themselves and the means to achieve them, thereby opening up a host 
of questions about current thinking and what is to be done in the future. The discussion suggests that all 
is far from well. At the heart of the new paradigms is an attempt by donors to bypass, ignore, and ﬁ  nd 
unlikely substitutes for badly functioning states with micro level and local initiatives. This occurs amidst 
the contradiction that the state still sets the macro-economic, legal and policy parameters or “rules of the 
game” within which other institutions and actors operate, many non-state entities are only nominally inde-
pendent, and a large number of technical initiatives aimed at growth and equity are misconceived.
*1  All examples come from research conducted by the author. An earlier version of this paper was written for a 
group of experts to Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations, to discuss rural development, 
environmental sustainability, and poverty alleviation.2  DESA Working Paper No. 11
Selected Examples and Critiques of New Paradigms
Decentralization
Decentralization is a central linchpin of the new paradigm of rural development. It is seen as an antidote 
to corrupt extractive states that characteristically have exploited the rural poor, a means of improving 
service delivery to them, and the best way of encouraging popular participation so that rural people will 
be party to their own development.
The above ideal type vision of what would occur if this paradigm were put into practice is not 
necessarily what has happened. Instead, when decentralization has been implemented, two situations have 
commonly arisen.
First, although decentralization was partly conceived as a way of overriding the state and its nega-
tive characteristics, its implementation often has reproduced the state in another guise. Formally, decen-
tralization is in place. Informally, however, decentralized authorities are often just new clones of the state. 
When this happens, as it often does, decentralized authorities are no different than their predecessors: no 
more accountable, no more democratic, and no more interested in the plight of the rural poor, integrated 
rural development, or environmental sustainability than the centralized state preceding them. Furthermore, 
locally the rural poor sometimes have fewer avenues of redress than in the past when they could appeal to 
a less parochial and higher authority that was removed from their day-to-day situations. Instead, because 
rural communities are often highly stratiﬁ  ed, authoritarian, corrupt, and repressive, as well as responsive 
to parochial interests, citizens often feel they cannot exercise their rights even when formally speaking, 
they have decentralized institutions through which they can articulate their grievances.
 Missing from the decentralization equation are two realities. Principally, and contrary to myth, 
rural communities are not normally harmonious Rousseauean states of nature. Instead, class and patron-
client relations stemming from various rural hierarchies and cleavages based on family ties, ethnicity, re-
ligious differences, as well as differing levels of access to state power divide populations. These divisions 
and cleavages tend to reproduce themselves institutionally in decentralized authorities, often offering no 
improvements over the central state, and sometimes a further regression to the mean from the standpoint 
of the rural poor. Furthermore, the decentralization equation falls into an unfortunate intellectual trap; 
it assumes one can change the way in which organizations operate solely by making formal changes in 
institutions or by developing new organizations. This ﬂ  ies in the face of reality. Similar formal institu-
tions in different places operate differently because of different norms, belief systems, and enforcement 
mechanisms. These are what Douglas North has called “rules of the game” (North, 1994) and tend to 
change over long periods of history rather than overnight. This is apparent from what has happened when 
the decentralization paradigm has been put into practice in developing countries. The results raise the 
broader question of whether the implementation of formally decentralized institutions is likely to achieve 
the mythical ends desired in light of existing theories about change and development as well as concrete 
realities on the ground.
Second, proponents of decentralization argue that local authorities tend to be less corrupt, more 
accountable, and more likely to improve rural service delivery than the centralized state. Often, this has 
not happened in practice. Instead, by virtue of setting up multiple foci of ﬁ  scal autonomy, decentralized 
authorities have the potential to be no better than the centralized state on all of the above counts Rural Development, Environmental Stability, and Poverty Alleviation  3
(Treisman, 2000). In fact, corruption among autonomous unaccountable authorities in Britain was one of 
the main reasons for later centralization.
Currently, to take just one of many possible examples, the operation of decentralized authori-
ties in Tanzania, illustrates the limits of formal decentralization discussed above. In the past, centralized 
government supported many extractive and ineffective parastatals at the local level and farmers were at 
their mercy. However, decentralized authorities in Tanzania now have recreated the state in a new guise, 
creating virtual chaos for small farmers as they apply different cesses on similar crops in different areas, 
all arbitrarily decided upon by the members of these authorities. The resulting extraction and chaos from 
the standpoint of small farmers is no more conducive to rural development and poverty alleviation than in 
the past (Delgado and Minot, 2000; Cooksey, 2003).
The above points and example illustrate Douglas North’s observations that changing the formal 
rules of the game is far easier than transforming the informal rules of the game and the norms and incen-
tive systems that support them. Furthermore, the fact that in the past the state often has performed badly 
does not mean that it is inherently incapable of being the engine of positive change. In many countries, it 
depends very much upon who is in charge, the tone that is set, and the degree to which the rule of law is 
entrenched and not on the intrinsic characteristics of the nation state per se. 
Issue: 
The tendency of international agencies and governments has been to deal with the formal aspects of rural 
institutions, imbuing those that are local with almost mythical characteristics, while ignoring the informal 
norms and practices that keep them from regressing to the mean and functioning as theory would suggest.
Consequently, international development agencies should reexamine how they think about institu-
tional change, both national and local, and what they expect from it under what conditions. The paradigm 
of decentralization as a panacea for most rural ills has been elevated to a level not supported historically 
(Amsden, 1989, 1984) or by current realities. Furthermore it is important to face, whether with centralized 
or decentralized institutions, the day-to-day experiences of many of today’s rural poor: lack of anonymity; 
fear of retribution and sanctions for criticizing the powers that be; few opportunities for genuine participa-
tion Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Green, 2000); and a lack of services regardless of the formal characteristics 
of institutions.
 Notwithstanding all the current attention being given by donors to institutional change and its 
affect on integrated rural development, environmental sustainability, and rural poverty, this critique raises 
a broader question. It concerns the saliency of institutions as an independent variable, especially given the 
sometimes unclear if not variable relationship historically between similar types of institutions and differ-
ent levels of development. Furthermore, institutions themselves may be intervening variables, something 
implied by North, but not acknowledged by current paradigms and their operationalization by interna-
tional development agencies. These are serious matters that must be thought about and spelled out more 
clearly as well as the role of the state, which is far from dead. 
Civil Society
Robert Putnam’s work on Italy (Putnam, 1993) found an early and statistically signiﬁ  cant relationship be-
tween the growth of non-state organizations and developmental effectiveness. This study followed the col-4  DESA Working Paper No. 11
lapse of the Soviet Union and a renewed emphasis by western donors on democratization in third world 
countries. During this brief hiatus, western donors no longer found it geo-politically necessary to support 
corrupt repressive states. For both reasons, donors promoted civil society organizations as a means of 
circumventing and developing an antidote to states that were extracting more from their rural populations 
than they were contributing to sustainable rural development.
Certainly, there are many excellent examples of what local populations and international donors 
can achieve by working with civil society organizations. Nevertheless, the assumptions both about civil 
society and what can be achieved with its assistance are often overblown and out of tune with the realities 
of rural life.
There has been a good deal of critical academic and other literature discussing the concept of civil 
society and its reality on the ground in many third world countries (Ndegwa, 1996; Harbeson, et.al., 1994; 
Orvis, 2003; Harris, 2002). Nevertheless, donors and international agencies have tended to analytically 
conﬂ  ate non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with the concept of civil society. They have assumed, 
often incorrectly, that the former is synonymous with the latter, simply because NGOs are not legally or 
formally part of the state. 
Contrary to myth, many NGOs in third world countries are not necessarily part of civil society 
(Rahman, 2002; Chabal and Daloz, 1998; Kasﬁ  r, 1998 to take just a few of many possible examples). 
As donors began assiduously to assist NGOs in preference to the state, numerous individuals as well as 
relatives of state employees and even the state in a new guise, began to set up NGOs to attract foreign 
assistance. Consequently, in many cases NGOs represented vested interests both outside and inside the 
state, were not always distinguishable from it, were sometimes a means of aggrandizing foreign aid, and 
were not necessarily more attuned to the rural poor or sustainable development than government or other 
organizations. 
In addition, even when NGOs have not been part and parcel of the state in a new guise, they are 
not inherently preferable to it. NGOs sometimes have been tied to local parochialisms, are not necessarily 
technically qualiﬁ  ed to assume tasks that have been foisted upon them, and often lack a national vision of 
development. Nevertheless, in the face of declining ﬁ  nancial assistance, leading to more and more priva-
tization of aid, plus the current view of the state as the enemy of development, international agencies and 
other donors have embraced civil society, with NGOs as its manifestation and its new panacea.
Issue:
Historically, in the West, East Asia and elsewhere, the state has played a central role in economic devel-
opment, a point discussed in detail by Amsden (Amsden, 1989, 1994), among others. Notwithstanding 
current paradigms to the contrary, sustainable rural development in the future will most likely still depend 
on the role of a strong progressive state (Joseph, 2003). The assumption that because many of today’s 
states are corrupt, repressive and not oriented towards their citizenry does not mean that the role of the 
state is unimportant or will go away. Furthermore, civil society often is shaped by the laws and enabling 
environment provided by the state and rarely has the ability to be a substitute for it, except in totally failed 
situations. In addition, the assumption that NGOs are part of civil society and an antidote to the state often 
ignores the reality that they are part of the latter, de facto, even if not de jure. International development 
agencies need to be more nuanced in their support of civil society and should not assume that NGOs and Rural Development, Environmental Stability, and Poverty Alleviation  5
civil society are necessarily one and the same. They need to acknowledge these realities, plus the histori-
cally important role of the state in their assistance strategies.
The uncritical support given by donors to both decentralization and NGOs is part of a new 
populist paradigm to bypass government and go directly to the people. It tends uncritically to assume that 
non-state actors are preferable to the state and to overemphasize the role of institutions, which are very 
difﬁ  cult to change at the informal and normative level. This state of affairs comes at a time, when devel-
opment agencies are not examining critically or in depth the real issue of what should be done substan-
tively to promote integrated rural development, environmental sustainability, and poverty alleviation. This 
may be in part because the problems seem so intractable and so many past paradigms of development 
have failed. Donors need to get back to the hard question of what is to be done, to understand that insti-
tutions are simply means in the process, and to recognize that non-state actors cannot substitute for the 
state, whose laws and policies still affect them. 
Macro-Micro and Sectoral Relationships
Any proper analysis of rural development, environmental sustainability, and poverty alleviation acknowl-
edges the importance of government in setting sound macro-economic, political, and social policy. These 
policies determine the parameters of what is possible in terms of development. However, the tendency 
among international development organizations has been to separate the macro from the micro, as if the 
former does not matter. Within many of these agencies, disciplines and sectors also often operate in isola-
tion from each other. However, poor rural people live in an integrated rather than a segmented world. It is 
almost a truism to say that the macro affects the micro and vice versa and that sectors do not exist in isola-
tion. However, often, one would hardly know this, looking at donor assistance strategies and their lending 
operations. Several examples follow, demonstrating how such approaches lead to assistance packages that 
misconceive problems and solutions and hence are designed to fail in terms of promoting rural develop-
ment or alleviating poverty.
In the 1980s and 1990s donors in Malawi often concentrated on what was viewed as a pro-poor 
development assistance strategy. Mostly, this consisted of rural development policies designed to support 
local producer groups and to increase the production of improved maize. In doing so, there was a failure 
to acknowledge one central macro-economic policy issue that radically reduced the possible effective-
ness of these micro-level initiatives. This was that government prohibited poor farmers on communal land 
from growing tobacco, the only lucrative cash crop. Until this policy changed, their incomes would not 
improve. Instead of dealing with this central economic policy of the state, donors, including most interna-
tional organizations, spent considerable effort supporting local grassroots intermediaries to give credit to 
poor farmers to produce improved maize. For a variety of reasons to be discussed later, this often was not 
economically viable. The result was that the problem was misconceived, farmers went into debt, and the 
proposed solutions did not work. 
During the same period in Lesotho, a good deal of development assistance supported local groups 
in farming even though Lesotho has no comparative advantage in agriculture, and historically the main 
source of income for the rural poor has been remittances from mining in South Africa. Even with income 
from mining declining, it might have been better for donors to acknowledge existing realities and put more 
of their funds into education that would increase the competitiveness of individuals seeking employment 
elsewhere rather than in agriculture. Instead, donors supported the animation of local grassroots groups, 6  DESA Working Paper No. 11
although it later became clear that individuals in these groups did not view farming as the mainstay of 
their existence and lacked the incentives to participate in such programs. Again, the result was failure.
In the case of Uganda, donors assisted local groups to develop organizations to protect the 
environment in an area where the hills were virtually denuded. These hills were of marginal interest to 
community members because their livelihood was mostly off-farm and did not stem from toiling their 
land. Hence, they did not have much incentive to put their labor into environmental protection. Again, not 
enough time was spent analyzing how individuals from rural communities, who looked like farmers, made 
their income or what their incentives were to engage in certain types of rural development initiatives. 
All three examples suggest that rural incomes and employment often are multi-sectoral, off-farm, 
and strongly affected both by macro-economic and national policy considerations. Hence, it is not pos-
sible to ignore the relationship between macro-level phenomena and micro-level behavior or to leave 
participation and social issues to anthropologists, political issues to political scientists, and economics to 
economists.
Related to the above is the fact that many seemingly perfect technical solutions are not perfect for 
all places at all times. Agricultural economists have devised theoretically sound technical interventions 
that often are not implemented because of a lack of political will by government, because of household 
labor constraints that make it difﬁ  cult for poor farmers to carry out the steps that would optimize produc-
tion, or because of cultural prohibitions and various types of constraints that keep markets from operating. 
Some examples follow. 
Kenya continued to violate its agreements with donors on grain marketing because those in 
charge of the state beneﬁ  ted from such an arrangement. The response of donors to government’s pattern of 
one step forward, three steps back, sometimes deliberately ignored the point that the problem was politi-
cal, related to protecting the vested interests of key actors, and not technical (O’Brien and Ryan, 2001). 
 Credit to the poorest of the poor in Malawi, used in vitro instead of in vivo estimates to argue 
for smaller and smaller packages of inputs on credit for maize. However, poor farmers generally were 
poised on the edge of famine. After six months, food ran out and they were mostly forced to hire out their 
labor to buy in food to subsist. This situation led to severe on-farm labor constraints. This translated into 
a tragic situation where farmers did not have the time to farm their own land adequately and could not 
afford to hire in labor. Consequently, they had to cut so many corners in the application of inputs that their 
yields and gross margins suffered. The results were far short of the original, albeit unrealistic and overly 
optimistic, estimates of donors that did not take into account the difﬁ  cult obstacles faced by poor farmers 
in the ﬁ  eld. Farmers’ incomes did not improve and they could not pay back their loans.
In other parts of Africa and in India, the creation of a land market, to take just one example, 
often does not operate like a market. Instead, cultural prohibitions on selling land on which ancestors are 
buried often undermines what might be a sound economic choice or investment strategy, or farmers are so 
indebted to money lenders that they are only de jure owners.
All of the above examples point out the importance of donors adopting integrated strategies of 
development that do not separate the micro from the macro and bring together rather than separate sectors 
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Issue:
To address the problems of sustainable rural development and poverty alleviation, donors must take ac-
count of the realities that both affect and characterize the daily lives of the rural poor. Rather than being 
separated as they are in today’s new paradigms, international agencies need to integrate the micro and the 
macro as well as the economic, political and social realities of the rural poor before devising untenable 
solutions for people whose lives are not separated into discrete parts.
International organizations and other donors do not support the above increasingly important 
matter. There is little attempt to recruit individuals who can think cross-sectorally. Routine tasks are 
turned into pseudo-specialties. One result is that agencies search for “experts” on NGOs, decentralization, 
poverty and other non-ﬁ  elds (presumably meaning someone who has worked in these areas) rather than 
for social scientists with sound training and solid analytical skills in one of the major established disci-
plines. Beyond this, there is an attempt to sidestep a serious analysis of the problems highlighted above 
by inventing new jargon to support new paradigms (e.g. sustainable livelihoods, capacity-building, civil 
society, decentralization, non-formal education, appropriate technologies, micro-enterprises, rural ﬁ  nan-
cial intermediaries, etc.). This masks the need for a serious rethinking of issues, approaches, and questions 
concerning the soundness and utility of one solution over another. Instead, the tendency is to think in a 
segmented fashion about problems that require integrated thinking, not to appreciate the constant relation-
ship between the micro and the macro, to ignore political considerations, to pretend that often powerful 
states do not exist, to turn mere tasks into nonexistent pseudo- disciplines, and to invent new jargon to 
homogenize extremely complex and diverse situations. The ultimate result is to seriously threaten, if not 
hamper, the ability of international agencies to address the very critical problems of rural development, 
poverty alleviation, and environmental sustainability today. Instead, the untouchable “isms” of bad jargon 
spewed forth by these new paradigms suppresses rather than invites questions.
Small Enterprise Development and Anti-Industrialization
In the West, East Asia, and elsewhere, industrialization plus the development of manufacturing was the 
engine of growth that transformed rural life. This vision of growth has all but been abandoned in the new 
paradigm of development with its emphasis on micro-initiatives.
In many third world countries, the environment for economic investment, whether domestic or 
foreign, has been negative. Many countries still are locked in patterns of single-commodity production, 
often representing legacies from the colonial period. For poor farmers, this has meant experiencing some-
thing akin to the great depression of 1929 every few years (Collier, 2001).
While speaking of the need for diversiﬁ  cation, donors simultaneously have encouraged the 
development of small enterprises. In part, this is a stopgap recognition that many rural poor are landless 
and that even others cannot rely on agriculture alone to survive. While these micro-enterprises constitute 
the real economy for many rural poor, they do not offer a substitute for employment, an assured wage, or 
much hope for improving their lives in the future. Instead, the rural poor overwork and underconsume. In 
such situations what is produced often cannot be sold or markets for such products are limited due to gluts 
of similar products (whether agricultural or non-agricultural), lack of quality control, the high costs of 
transport, or international standards.8  DESA Working Paper No. 11
Paradigms opposed to strong centralized state-propelled development often have supported what 
purported to be more people-oriented micro-enterprises. Along with this situation coupled with the idea of 
appropriate technology came the phrase “small is beautiful”. Donors obliged by supporting small enter-
prises where farming was unviable, land was inadequate to support consumption, and where few jobs 
were available for the rural poor. Notwithstanding this reality, it is worth noting that in the West, one out 
of two small businesses fail, even when conditions are more supportive. Hence, myth to the contrary, the 
results of so many failed small enterprises in third world countries should not be surprising. Furthermore, 
they also are unlikely to represent a panacea in terms of rural development or poverty alleviation.
Both development agencies and entrepreneurs engaged in small businesses often have neglected 
to analyze whether the desire to have a local bread factory, a stall-feeding project, or to produce local 
potato seeds, tools, and crafts is something that can turn a proﬁ  t. Surprisingly enough, much donor aid for 
micro-enterprise development is both unviable and unproﬁ  table. Farmers in Lesotho were encouraged to 
produce potato seeds only to discover that their same extension ofﬁ  cer had a nearby community do the 
same thing, resulting in a glut. Donors supported women with sewing machines to expand dressmaking 
in Mauritius. However, the liberalization of the market accompanying Mauritius’s impressive economic 
transformation also crushed these businesses and others, as they could no longer compete either with fac-
tory-made garments made locally or with imports. Both were more competitive in terms of price and qual-
ity. In Malawi, a stall-feeding project that might have been viable for one or two people produced almost 
no proﬁ  ts for a large group. In Mozambique, local farmers preferred to buy South African tools instead of 
what their own neighbors made because the quality of the former was superior and lasted longer. Even in 
India, small businessmen often have to pay off state agents or are in such a vicious circle of indebtedness 
to landlords that they are only paper owners of their land and their enterprises.
Notwithstanding the new paradigm of small business development as opposed to industrializa-
tion, a good deal of micro-enterprise development is both unviable and unproﬁ  table as soon as one looks 
below the surface. However, the myth that “small is beautiful” persists even though it is often a symptom 
of poverty and may increase rather than alleviate it.
When small entrepreneurs are successful and do well, often it is without credit, in contrast to 
prevailing wisdom on the subject. What keeps these small businessmen and women from enlarging their 
enterprises, becoming more successful, and maturing into medium and large-scale businesses that could 
offer rural employment? In Tanzania and parts of Central Asia, there is a phrase, the “missing middle”, 
to describe this phenomenon. Here, in large part, it is the lack of a fair environment that prevents small 
enterprises from moving up to the next stage. Small business people in this situation often face a plethora 
of hostile governmental laws, regulations, and tax regimes required by the state to enlarge their businesses. 
Discouraged by this, micro-entrepreneurs tend to deﬂ  ate their horizons and retreat to smallness, staying just 
below the state’s radar screen so that they can operate free of harassment. Foreign direct investment some-
times responds in the same way: failing to invest or divesting where the business environment is hostile. In 
both situations, any progress towards developing the manufacturing sector or industrializing is thwarted.
Issue:
For reasons that are not entirely clear, development agencies have shied away from discussing the above 
issues. International agencies dealing with rural development, sustainability, and poverty alleviation have 
tended uncritically and indiscriminately to embrace micro-entrepreneurship as a panacea, when it is at 
best a stopgap measure in terms of rural development and poverty alleviation. Agencies need to acknowl-Rural Development, Environmental Stability, and Poverty Alleviation  9
edge both the conceptual problems in this approach as well as the immense difﬁ  culties faced by all types 
of entrepreneurs where the state erects legal and other barriers designed to destroy them and the business 
climate in general, thereby increasing rural poverty and impeding development. 
International development organizations also need once again to discuss the possibilities for de-
veloping manufacturing and industry as a means of providing employment opportunities to address rural 
poverty and development. Donors have tended to concentrate on micro-level rural solutions to micro-
level poverty when the real solutions may not be, and historically have not been, in situ at all. Here one is 
reminded of Chang’s notation in his work, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development in Historical Perspec-
tive, (Chang, 2002) that the development advice offered by donors has tended to follow the motto “ do as 
I say, not as I do”. 
Privatization of Marketing, Input Supply, and Rural Financial Services
After independence, most developing countries used parastatals to provide marketing, input supply, and 
ﬁ  nancial services. This was both a legacy of the colonial period and a reafﬁ  rmation of the dominant 
Keynesian state-centric paradigm.
Parastatals did not serve their rural clients well. They tended to take the lion’s share of the world 
market prices, had high administrative expenses, supported vested interests, often did not collect perish-
able commodities on time, and paid farmers late, if at all. Many rural development banks chose their 
borrowers badly, relied on weak ﬁ  nancial intermediaries, had high arrears, eventually went bankrupt, 
and were closed. Lending also tended to be highly politicized. Rich farmers often deliberately defaulted. 
Many poor farmers had such small proﬁ  ts that they were forced to choose between eating and paying back 
their loans. Both groups had many clever male ﬁ  de borrowers, whom the state lured in by saying incor-
rectly that loans to them were free. The experience of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and Pride Africa 
in Tanzania gave rise to the somewhat misleading phrase, “the poor are bankable”. Consequently, donors 
pressured third world governments to push more and more credit out to poorer and poorer clients, making 
repayment increasingly improbable.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, international donors began more critically to assess 
the performance of the state in many areas. In terms of marketing, rural ﬁ  nancial and input supply 
services, the state received poor marks whether from the standpoint of quality of service delivery, cost 
effectiveness, or reaching their rural clientele. Instead, it was seen correctly to be wasteful, self-serving, 
and corrupt.
Along with this analysis came a new paradigm promoting private sector development and a 
greater emphasis on market forces. In many respects, this new emphasis has been salutary. A number of 
parastatals have been privatized and those that remain are being forced to compete with the private sector. 
In other cases, privatization in the countries of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere has been less san-
guine (Kotkin, 2001), sometimes resulting in the wholesale looting of the state.
With the emergence of this new paradigm of the market as opposed to the state, other problems 
have appeared. 
In the era of state-centric paradigms, rural areas, particularly in Africa, were peppered with 
government-owned and operated development banks, cooperative parastatal marketing agencies, and a 
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done badly. Now that government has scaled back or privatized these parastatals, numerous rural areas 
are bereft of agricultural services. Many banks and private marketing agents have found it too costly and 
unproﬁ  table to go to remote rural areas where roads are bad, clients are dispersed, and production output 
is often low and of poor quality. Even when private businessmen go to these places, rural producers often 
are faced with a monopoly buyer or provider and are just as vulnerable to the exploitation and poor ser-
vices they experienced in the past.
The withdrawal of subsidies for inputs eliminated many market distortions. However, this with-
drawal coupled with the devaluation of many third world currencies often radically increased the price of 
inputs. Although agricultural prices for small farmers also have increased with devaluation, the margin 
of difference is still not necessarily enough to compensate for the high cost of inputs. Furthermore, even 
in cases where privatization of services has occurred, the state often still is involved in agriculture and 
continues to capture a margin of the proﬁ  ts.
As parastatal development banks have been privatized, many private banks decided it was not 
cost-effective to have a signiﬁ  cant presence in rural areas. Hence, when they are there at all, they often 
reach only as far down as the district and provincial levels. Consequently, rural populations often have 
no reliable access to any ﬁ  nancial services, whether safekeeping, withdrawal, savings, or credit. Implicit 
in the idea of the new paradigms was that donors should support the institutional strengthening of rural 
ﬁ  nancial intermediaries, such as cooperatives, community based organizations, NGOs, and informal rotat-
ing savings and credit groups. The assumption has been that such support would build up these groups that 
then could offer ﬁ  nancial services to the rural poor that formal institutions were no longer there to provide.
While many of the above solutions under the new paradigm sound sanguine in theory, rural inhab-
itants now commonly are faced either with no or totally inadequate rural agricultural services. Marketing 
and input supply services are often problematic at best, while rural communities generally view existing 
ﬁ  nancial intermediaries, especially cooperatives, as corrupt and ineffective, Rousseauean development 
jargon notwithstanding. In Tanzania, while farmers buy minimal shares in cooperative societies as a quasi-
insurance policy, they have little faith in their integrity based on their past performance. Hence, they still 
prefer putting their cash under their pillows or into hard assets rather than joining rural ﬁ  nancial interme-
diaries, which they do not trust. In India, cooperative members tend to exclude less well-off farmers and 
also, even when they are allowed to join, ﬁ  nd that the majority of inputs go to local elites.
Issue:
While the state of old tended to deliver inadequate, unreliable agricultural services, currently many farm-
ers now receive almost no services. The question of how serious this is and what, if anything should be 
done has yet to be confronted by international donor agencies, which are still locked into the idea that 
the new market paradigm has been successful, as it has been in some cases. However, currently many 
farmers have poor access to services, have an output that is barely remunerative, and have few alternative 
employment opportunities. In previous periods of history elsewhere when farming became uncompetitive, 
individuals moved to large cities and worked in factories. Currently, in many developing countries, there 
is already a mass out-migration of labor, but with little chance of employment either in the rural areas, 
where they are already marginalized, or in the urban areas where there is great competition for few jobs. 
International development agencies interested in the challenges of rural development, environ-
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market has created a host of new problems that cannot be ignored, notwithstanding the problems inherent 
in the old paradigms of the past.
Capacity-Building
With the coming of new paradigms and new worldviews, the word “capacity” has entered the develop-
mental lexus. It is now used widely without any speciﬁ  city. Donors and others often speak about a “lack 
of capacity” to describe a problem or “capacity-building” as a way of solving it. The question is what 
does all of this mean concretely? 
Institutions that are not performing well can have any number of problems. These include being 
badly managed, having unqualiﬁ  ed staff, having workers who lack incentives because they are badly paid 
or otherwise demoralized, not having proper equipment, or being engaged in state-supported or individual 
corruption. Each of these problems is very different and implies very different solutions.
Unfortunately, many discussions of rural development, poverty alleviation and environmental sus-
tainability use the term “capacity-building” indiscriminately, without stating what is meant and proposing 
solutions that mostly have nothing to do with the real problems, which rarely are spelled out. Routinely, 
donors choose to modernize equipment and to train staff as a means of improving how organizations func-
tion. However, often a lack of equipment and a lack of training, while relatively easily provided as solu-
tions, are not the real problems. 
A Northian approach to institutions (North, 1994), e.g. trying to understand the formal and infor-
mal rules of the game and the incentives and disincentives that support certain types of behavior, would 
help to ground the idea of institution- or capacity- building in some reality. It would do so by specifying 
the real problem behind badly functioning institutions, while tying ideas about how to strengthen them to 
speciﬁ  c problems.
In Gabon, to take just one example, an international donor agency was planning to develop a proj-
ect to reform public expenditure management. One goal was to improve rural service delivery in the areas 
of health and education, which had been poor. The initial idea of the means to this end was to increase 
controls in the public expenditure system to ensure that funds intended for health and education would 
reach their intended beneﬁ  ciaries. However, further investigation by the donor revealed that the problem 
was not one of controls, but rather that the entire system was highly politicized and existing controls were 
being bypassed in favor of presidential directives. It was this politicization and the incentives that support-
ed it that led to a poorly functioning public expenditure system and a lack of rural service delivery, not 
a need for more controls, more computers, or staff training. The existing public expenditure system was 
so highly aggregated that it was impossible to trace an economic vote in health or education to determine 
whether these services had reached their intended beneﬁ  ciaries. Again, the aggregation itself indicated 
that there was a political method to the madness. As a result of its analysis, the donor agency decided not 
to go ahead with its initial project. Without asking the right questions and doing this research, the agency 
in question might have moved ahead to support a variety of traditional “capacity-building” activities that 
would have been irrelevant in terms of changing institutional performance.
In another case in Uganda, political factors led to a National Environmental Management Author-
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neutral ministry, such as planning. The reasons for this institutional choice stemmed not from a lack of 
knowledge or “capacity” but from politics and an internal calculation of “ethnic arithmetic”. In this in-
stance, as well as many others, using the term “capacity” or applying traditional solutions implied by the 
word would have been far off the mark.
Issue:
Discussions of a lack of access by the poor to social services and the problem of developing a supportive 
environment for private sector development, to take just two examples, often regress to highly general 
euphemisms, such as institutional “capacity-building” in proposing solutions. Such euphemisms avoid 
analyzing situations to the point where they identify speciﬁ  c problems or discuss causal means-ends rela-
tionships, indicating whether there are any concrete solutions to the problems identiﬁ  ed and, if so, what 
actions by international development agencies would best support them.
Furthermore, many problems experienced by the rural poor in a host of areas—whether health, 
education, social protection, access to land and other services, or poorly functioning institutions that do 
not serve them—often are found to be political rather than technical. Donor agencies need to acknowledge 
political impediments as such rather than resorting to euphemistic no speak such as “capacity-building”, 
or strategies to promote integrated rural development, address poverty and ensure environmental sustain-
ability will be ineffective. 
Conclusions
The above analysis has singled out a series of topics, by no means comprehensive, to highlight issues aris-
ing from the application of recent paradigms of development. The argument is that a number of these new 
paradigms of rural development, environmental sustainability, and poverty alleviation raise both concep-
tual problems and operational difﬁ  culties when they are implemented on the ground. In some cases, the 
ideas currently being proposed by development agencies as solutions bear little relationship to the realities 
or problems experienced by the rural poor on a daily basis. In other cases, the paradigms themselves are 
often mythical in their conception, representing desired end states. Hence, when implemented they tend 
not to work as they conﬂ  ict with existing realities and are theoretically unsound.
Furthermore, in all of the paradigms discussed above, there is a common tendency to ignore or 
escape the reality of dealing with the monster in the room—poorly functioning corrupt governments 
that contribute to poverty and often destroy rather than promote development. International development 
agencies have responded by supporting a plethora of actors nominally outside the state. Often, however, 
these actors are not independent and even when they are they are still subject to the laws, policies, regula-
tory procedures, and power of the state, an entity that has always been of paramount importance. There 
is a tendency to ignore this reality. When it is not ignored, the unfortunate term “governance” is invoked 
as if one can build sound states (Grzymala-Busse and Jones-Luong, 2001) the same way one ﬁ  xes water 
faucets in need of repair. Historically, the state, either directly or indirectly, has been a critical engine of 
growth, something that cannot be denied. Paradigms that ignore this reality are salves that will not heal 
real wounds. The difﬁ  culty is this: non-state actors are not substitutes for the state and bad states cannot 
be ﬁ  xed easily, as North (North, 1994) so eloquently notes.
From a policy perspective, this analysis is intended as a point of departure to think critically about 
current approaches to rural development and attempt to get away from much of the simplistic jargonistic Rural Development, Environmental Stability, and Poverty Alleviation  13
thinking that has characterized current analysis. While the road ahead may be fraught with difﬁ  culties, 
they must be acknowledged. Today, Sub-Saharan Africa has been experiencing what one author describes 
as a “catastrophe”, with per capital GDP lower than in the 1980s and a declining life expectancy (Stern, 
2002, p. 31). Current thinking about rural development, environmental sustainability, and poverty al-
leviation is unfortunately far removed from addressing either this catastrophe in Africa or those in other 
regions, including the downward spiral into poverty in much of Europe and Central Asia. One of the main 
barriers to sound inquiry are bad paradigms, the bad “isms” that ﬂ  ow from them, and the refusal to think 
hard and honestly about the very difﬁ  cult problems of rural development, environmental sustainability, 
and poverty alleviation.
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